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PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU: JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONCEPTUAL DIRECTIONS
CHRISTOPHER H. BOVIS*
1. Introduction
The significance of liberalized and integrated public procurement as an
essential component of the Single Market is well documented.1 Public
procurement regulation in the European Union has been influenced by policy
developments which identified purchasing practices of Member States as a
considerable non-tariff barrier and as a hindering factor for the functioning of
a genuinely competitive internal market.2 Economic justifications for
regulating public procurement have pointed towards introducing
competitiveness into the relevant markets in order to increase cross-border
penetration of products and services destined for the public sector and achieve
price transparency and convergence across the EuropeanUnion, thus resulting
in significant savings.3
In parallel to the economic justifications, legal imperatives have positioned
the regulation of public procurement as a necessary condition for the
accomplishment of principles such as the free movement of goods and
services, the right of establishment and the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of nationality.4 The need for competitiveness and transparency in
* JD, LLM, MPhil, FRSA, H.K. Bevan Chair in Law, Law School, University of Hull. In
memory of Peter Cnossen.
1. See Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Single Market
Act, COM(2010)608 final.
2. See Commission,White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market, COM(85)310
final; also CommissionGreen Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring
the way forward, 1996; and Commission Communication on Public Procurement in the
European Union, COM(98)143.
3. See Commission, The Cost of Non-Europe, Basic Findings, Vol. 5, Part A; The Cost of
Non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement, (Luxembourg, 1988). Also the Cechinni Report
1992 The European Challenge (Aldershot, Wildwood House, 1988).
4. See Drijber and Stergiou, “Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law”, 46 CML
Rev. (2009), 805–846; also Bovis, “Recent case law relating to public procurement: A beacon
for the integration of public markets”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 1025–1056.
Common Market Law Review 49: 247–290, 2012.
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public procurement markets is considered as safeguard to the attainment of
fundamental principles of the Treaties.5
The current public procurement legal regime6 treats differently public
sector procurement and utilities procurement. Two reasons appear to justify
this development. Firstly, as a result of the positive effects of liberalization of
network industries which has stimulated sectoral competitiveness, a more
relaxed regime for utilities procurement, irrespective of their public or
privatized ownership has been justified and accepted. Secondly, to achieve the
opening up of the relatively closed and segmented public sector procurement
markets, the separate regulation between public and utilities procurement
resulted in a codified set of rules for the public sector which aims at producing
legal efficiency, simplification and compliance7 by covering supplies, works
and services procurement in a single legal instrument.8
The evolution of public procurement law has been shaped by the Court of
Justice. The Court’s jurisprudence has influenced the interpretation of public
procurement legal concepts such as contracting authorities,9 the remit of
selection and qualification criteria,10 and the parameters for contracting
5. See Bovis, “The State, Competition and Public Services”, in Birkinshaw and Varney
(Eds.), The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon (Kluwer, 2010). Also, Joined Cases
C-223/99 & C-260/99, Agora Srl v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano and
Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Runa & C v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano, [2001]
ECR I-3605; Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV, [1998]
ECR I-6821; Case C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlangenbau Austria AG et al. v. Strohal
Rotationsdurck GesmbH, [1998] ECR I-73.
6. See Directive 2004/18 (Public Sector Directive), O.J. 2004, L 134/114, on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and
public service contracts and Directive 2004/17(Utilities Directive), O.J. 2004, L 134/1
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport
and postal services sectors.
7. See Bovis, “Developing public procurement regulation: Jurisprudence and its influence
on law making”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 461–495.
8. See Directive 2004/18, cited supra note 6
9. See Case C-237/99, Commission v. France, [2001] ECR I-939; Case C-470/99,
Universale-Bau and Others, [2002] ECR I-11617; Case C-373/00, Adolf Truly, [2003]
ECR-193; Case C-84/03, Commission v. Spain, [2005] ECR I-139; Mannesmann, cited supra
note 5; Case C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes B.V. v. Netherlands State, [1988] ECR 4635; BFI
Holding, cited supra note 5; Agora, cited supra note 5 and Excelsior, cited supra note 5; Case
C-343/95, Diego Cali et Figli, [1997] ECR 1-1547; Case C-380/98, The Queen and H.M.
Treasury, ex parte University of Cambridge, [2000] ECR I-8035; Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle,
RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und
Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna, [2005] ECR I-1; Case C-107/98, Teckal Slr v.
Comune di Viano, [1999] ECR I-8121; Case C-18/01, Korhonen and Others, [2003] ECR
I-5321.
10. See Case C-315/01, Gesellschaft für Abfallentsorgungs-Technik GmbH (GAT) and
ÖsterreichischeAutobahnen und SchnellstraßenAG (ÖSAG), ECR [2003] I-6351; Joined Cases
C-21 & 34/03, Fabricom SA v. Belgian State, [2005] ECR I-1559; Joined Cases C-285 &
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authorities to use environmental and social considerations11 as award
criteria.
The first part of this overview provides a critical evaluation of concepts
developed and evolved through the case law of the ECJ, especially after the
enactment of the current public procurement directives in 2006. The second
part assesses the principles which underpin the public procurement remedies
regime and determine the judicial review of public contracts at national level,
particularly after the coming into force of the Remedies Directive in 2009.The
third part exposes the exhaustive harmonization prescribed in the current
public procurement directives as the cause of their porosity and the resultant
ineffectiveness of the public procurement acquis.
The article’s main aim is to draw upon emerging conceptual themes from
the Court’s case law which determine the traction of the procurement rules
and prompted the European Commission to launch a Green Paper12 to revise
the substantive public procurement directives. The author envisages
earmarking the areas of the forthcoming revision of the (substantive)
directives as a result of recent case law developments. The second aim is to
demonstrate that exhaustive harmonization as the main strategic shortcoming
of the current public procurement directives has caused significant porosity in
the directives, which has resulted in a legal lacuna. The Court has pointed at
the adverse effect of porosity and the recurrent danger of limiting the
effectiveness of the public procurement acquis. The author will reflect on
theway the porosity of the public procurement directives is treated through the
application of the transparency principle and its surrogate principle of equality
and will demonstrate that the result of such treatment is to fortify the public
procurement directives by supplementing their thrust with powers enshrined
in primary Union law.
Finally, the article aims to provide insights to possible legal reforms of the
substantive public procurement directives in the light of the EU 2020 Growth
Strategy.
286/99, Lombardini and Mantovani, [2001] ECR I-9233; Case C-324/98, Telaustria and
Telefonadress, [2000] ECR I-10745; Case C-126/03, Commission v. Germany, [2004] ECR
I-11197; Case C-176/98, Holst Italia, [1999] ECR I-8607, para 29; Case C-399/98, Ordine
degli Architetti and Others, [2001] ECR I-5409, para 92; Case C-314/01, Siemens and ARGE
Telekom & Partner, [2004] ECR I-2549, para 44; Case C-57/01, Makedoniko Metro and
Mikhaniki, [2003] ECR I-1091.
11. Beentjes, supra note 9; Case C-225/98, Commission v. France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais),
[2000] ECR 7445; Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Filandia Oy Ab v. Helsingin Kaupunki et
HKL-Bussiliikenne, [2002] ECR 7213.
12. See Green Paper on the modernization of EU public procurement policy: Towards a
more efficient European Procurement Market, COM(2011)15/47.
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2. The traction of public procurement directives
Two fundamental concepts are those of contracting authorities (contracting
entities in Utilities procurement) and public contracts which determine the
applicability of the public procurement directives.
2.1. Developments in the Court’s case law on the concept of contracting
authorities
2.1.1. Contracting authorities and the applicability of the public
procurement directives
The Court has developed the test of functionality, interpreting the term
contracting authorities in broad and functional terms13 in order to bring under
the remit of contracting authorities a range of undertakings connectedwith the
pursuit of public interest. Contracting authorities under the Public Sector
Directive embrace the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by
public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or
several of such bodies governed by public law.14 The Utilities Directive
recognizes as contracting entities public undertakings, over which the
contracting authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant
influence by virtue of their ownership of them, their financial participation
therein, or the rules which govern them.15The Utilities Directive includes also
as contracting entities undertakings which, although they are not contracting
13. Mannesmann, supra note 5, paras. 20 and 21; Universale-Bau, supra note 9, paras.
51–53; Case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, [2003] ECR I-4667, paras. 52 and 53; and Case
C-283/00, Commission v. Spain, [2003] ECR I-11697, para 69.
14. SeeArt. 1(9) of the Public Sector Directive andArt. 2(1)(a) of the Utilities Directive.A
body governed by public law means any organization which satisfies, cumulatively, the
following conditions First, the organization must be established for the specific purpose of
meeting needs in the general interest which do not have an industrial or commercial character;
secondly, it must have legal personality; and thirdly, it must be financed, for themost part, by the
State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law.Alternatively and as
part of the third criterion, a body governed by public law must be subject to management
supervision by the State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law or
it must have an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose
members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed
by public law. Non-exhaustive lists of bodies and categories of bodies governed by public law
which fulfil the three cumulative criteria for a body governed by public law are set out inAnnex
III of the Directive.
15. See Art. 2(1)(b) of the Utilities Directive. Contracting authorities exercise dominant
influence upon public undertakings when directly or indirectly, in relation to an undertaking,
hold the majority of the undertaking’s subscribed capital, or control the majority of the votes
attaching to shares issued by the undertaking, or can appointmore than half of the undertaking’s
administrative, management or supervisory body.
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authorities or public undertakings themselves, operate on the basis of special
or exclusive rights granted by a competent authority of a Member State
through means of legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions.16
The test of dualism,17 as developed by the Court refers to the ability of
mixed-character undertakings to be regarded as contracting authorities,
provided they pursue public interest functions of a non-industrial or
commercial character. Consequently, Commission v. Spain18 has recognized
as contracting authorities private law entities and stipulated that an entity
which is governed by private law but meets all the requirements of bodies
governed by public law is considered to be a contracting authority.The entity’s
private law status does not preclude it from being considered as a contracting
authority, and in particular is not incompatible with the requirement of
non-industrial or commercial character of the general interest needs, since
these factorsmust be assessed individually and separately from the legal status
of an entity.An entity governed by private law as a contracting authority is also
compatible with the concept of public undertakings, in accordance with the
Utilities Directive.
In Adolf Truly and Korhonen19 the Court also regarded as contracting
authorities private entities for industrial and commercial development, where
in particular a limited company established, owned andmanaged by a regional
authoritymeets a need in the general interest which has not a commercial or an
industrial character, where it acquires services for the development of
business and commercial activities on the territory of that regional authority.
The Court maintained in Universale-Bau20 that entities meeting needs of
general interest retrospectively are contracting authorities. Therefore, an
entity which has not been established for the specific purpose of meeting
needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character,
but which has subsequently taken responsibility for such needs is considered
as a body governed by public law, on condition that the assumption of
responsibility for meeting those needs can be established objectively. Stadt
Halle21 concerned semi-public undertakings as contracting authorities, where
in particular a company governed by private law and legally distinct from a
contracting authority, but in which the contracting authority has a majority
capital holding and exercises a certain degree of control is considered as a
16. See Art. 2(3) of the Utilities Directive.
17. Mannesmann, supra note 5, paras. 17–35.
18. C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, cited supra note 13, paras. 54, 55 and 60; and Case
C-283/00, Commission v. Spain. cited supra note 13, para 75.
19. Adolf Truly, cited supra note 9, para 66, and Korhonen, cited supra note 9, paras. 48
and 59.
20. Universale-Bau, cited supra note 9, paras. 51–53;
21. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9.
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contracting authority. The Court also considered a state-controlled
commercial company as contracting authority when it is deemed unlikely that
it will bear the financial risks related to its activities, as the State would take all
necessary measure to protect its financial viability.22
Oymanns23 brought under the conceptual premise of a “body governed by
public law” a statutory sickness-fund which was indirectly financed by the
State without any consideration in return, but it received mandatory
contributions set by law from employers and private individual members and
had no discretion in setting the levels or conditions of contributions. The
justification was that the statutory sickness-fund was deemed to be financed
for the most part, by the State, as a result of the mandatory setting of the levels
or conditions of contributions, and had the sole objective to perform interests
in the general needs such as social security functions, with no industrial or
commercial character. In similar vein, Bayerischer Rundfunk24 considered the
mandatory fee contributions of private individuals to a broadcasting fund, the
level of which were set by law, as State financing of the relevant undertaking,
thus bringing it into the category of “body governed by public law”.
2.1.2. Contracting authorities and the non-applicability of the public
procurement directives
The test of commercialism25 indicates that profitability and commercially
motivated decision-making on the part of an undertaking can render the public
procurement directives inapplicable. It was in Korhonen26 when the Court
recognized that contracting authorities are free to set up legally independent
entities if they wish to offer services to third parties under normal market
conditions. If such entities aim to make profit, bear the losses related to the
exercise of their activities, and perform no public tasks, they are not classified
as contracting authorities.An entity which aims to make a profit and bears the
losses associated with the exercise of its activity will not normally become
involved in a contract award procedure on conditions that are not
economically justified. In parallel, the test of competitiveness27 indicates that
any element of competition from private undertakings in the activities of an
undertaking, dilutes the assumption that the undertaking is considered as a
22. See Case C-283/00, Commission v. Spain, cited supra note 13. See also Adolf Truly,
cited supra note 9, para 42, and Korhonen, cited supra note 9, paras. 51 and 52.
23. See Case C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR, Orthopädie Schuhtechnik,
v. AOK Rheinland/Hamburg, [2009] ECR I-4779.
24. See Case C-337/06, Bayerischer Rundfunk et al v. GEWA, [2007] ECR I-11173.
25. See Cases BFI Holding BV, cited supra note 5 and Mannesmann, cited supra note 5.
26. Korhonen, cited supra note 9, para 51.
27. Agora, cited supra note 5; Korhonen, cited supra note 9, para 51.
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body governed by public law.Therefore, proof of the competitiveness test also
renders the public procurement rules inapplicable.
Finally, the test of dependency28 applied by the Court in Teckal,29 reveals
two distinctive features which provide for the parameters of inapplicability of
the public procurement directives: first, the similarity of control of an
undertaking to that exercised by contracting authorities over their own
departments and secondly, the operational connection of the undertaking’s
activities to the remit of the contracting authority exercising similar control
over it.
2.1.3. The in-house procurement arrangements
2.1.3.1. Similarity of control and contracting authorities
Teckal30 brought flexibility to determining the concept of contracting
authorities and established the non-applicability of the procurement rules to
in-house relations. The first criterion of Teckal is present when control similar
to that which the contracting entity exercises over one of its own departments
is evident. The notion of control and the similarity requirement merit a
comprehensive approach, not solely based on company law features or the
level of the contracting authority’s shareholding. Normally, corporate control
indicates decisive influence over management actions, operational and
strategic decisions in a similar manner to the concept of majority shareholder
control found in company laws ofMember States. Nevertheless, any appraisal
of the legal position of amajority shareholder in order to assert controlmust be
taken in conjunction with the statutes governing the relevant entity over which
the control is exercised and not by sole reference to national company law
provisions, as often minority shareholdings provide for rights of decisive
influence, such as specific oversight and blocking rights.
The notion of control for the purposes of in-house contracts, as developed
by the Court, entails much more than the ingredients of “dominant influence”
as a company law notion, or as a public procurement notion which defines
certain bodies as contracting authorities. In particular, control is extended
beyond the “dominant influence” notion found in Utilities Directive.31 For the
purposes of in-house relations, the object of such control should not be
28. Commission v. France; University of Cambridge; Teckal: all cited supra note 9.
29. Teckal, cited supra note 9.
30. Ibid.
31. See Art. 2(1)(b) of the Utilities Directive in relation to public undertakings. A public
undertaking is any undertaking over which the contracting authorities may exercise directly or
indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation
therein, or the rules which govern it. Contracting authorities exercise dominant influence upon
public undertakings when directly or indirectly, in relation to an undertaking, hold the majority
of the undertaking’s subscribed capital, or control the majority of the votes attaching to shares
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confined to strategic market decisions or procurement decisions, but should
embrace individual management and operational decisions as well. Corporate
control is exercised by conclusive influence on both strategic objectives and
significant decisions.
In Parking Brixen,32 the Court stated that the important point in relation to
the control criterion is that there should be “a potential power of decisive
influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions”. With
respect to the means of control, rights to give instructions and rights to make
appointments, as well as evidence of supervisory powers, reflect upon a
guiding principle which is de facto conclusive of the power to influence
corporate behaviour and does not emanate from legislative provisions alone.
In Cabotermo,33 it was maintained that joint-stock public companies
exhibit similarity of control where a contracting authority holds, alone or
together with other public authorities, all the share capital in an entity.
However, if the board of management of that entity is vested with the broadest
possible powers and in the absence of any control or specific voting powers for
restricting the board’s freedom of action, the similarity of control is not
present. If control exercised by a contracting authority over an entity could be
viewed as consisting essentially of the majority shareholders’ rights conferred
by company law, such control cannot be deemed as similar to that exercised
upon the contracting authority’s own departments. Moreover, if control is
exercised through an intermediary, such as a holding company, the
intervention of such an intermediary may render the similarity of control
requirement irrelevant or it may weaken any control exercised by the
contracting authority over a joint-stock company merely because it holds
shares in that company.
Nevertheless, if an entity is jointly controlled by several contracting
authorities, the control criterion is satisfied if all the contracting authorities
exhibit control over the relevant entity similar to that over their own
departments.34 In such situations, as in the case of inter-municipal cooperative
societies whose members are contracting authorities themselves, if joint
control is exercised by the majority of controlling contracting authorities, the
similarity of control criterion is met.35
issued by the undertaking, or can appoint more than half of the undertaking’s administrative,
management or supervisory body.
32. See Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-8612, para 65.
33. See Case C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA, Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio,
AGESP SpA, [2006] ECR I-4137.
34. Ibid., para 57.
35. See Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d’Uccle, Région de
Bruxelles-Capitale, [2009] ECR I-8457.
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Therefore, the concept of control must be understood in functional and not
in formal terms.There is nothing to prevent it being applied to the relationship
between a contracting authority and legal persons governed by private law,
such as a limited liability company.The use of the term “departments” derives
from the original reason for setting up autonomous bodies, which was to
entrust particular departments with a function or the delivery of a specific
public service. The control exercised over an entity or an undertaking by a
public authority must be similar to that which the authority exercises over its
own departments, but not identical in every respect and must be effective, but
it is not essential that it be exercised individually.36
However, the existence of private capital participating in an entity which
has corporate links with a contracting authority negates the similarity of
control requirement. Stadt Halle37 held that private sector participation cannot
emulate the pursuit of public interest objectives entrusted to public sector
entities. The relationship between a public authority which is a contracting
authority and its own departments is governed by considerations and
requirements proper to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest. Any
private capital investment in an undertaking follows considerations
appropriate to private interests and pursues objectives of a different kind.38
The participation, even as a minority, of a private undertaking in the capital of
a company in which the awarding public authority is also a participant
excludes in any event the possibility of that public authority exercising over
such a company control similar to that which it exercises over its own
departments.39
The category of semi-public entities or undertakings, which in their own
right are regarded as contracting authorities, could not be viewed as entities
upon which a contracting authority can exercise similar control to that over its
own departments. The Court inMödling40 followed the Stadt Halle reasoning
and, interestingly, held that if the award of an in-house public contract took
place in accordance with the Teckal criteria, but within a very short period the
controlling contracting authority transferred shares in the controlled entity to
a private undertaking, this was tantamount to a device designed to conceal the
award of public service contracts to semi-public companies and as a result it
would prejudice the effectiveness and the principles of the public procurement
directives.
36. Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32, para 62.
37. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9.
38. Ibid., para 50.
39. Ibid., para 49.
40. See Case C-29/04, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-563.
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Parking Brixen precludes similarity of control in situations where imminent
participation of private capital in a wholly owned public undertaking or entity
can be seen. Interestingly, although ANAV41 extends the Teckal criteria to
companies limited by shares, it appears to link prospective privatizations as a
ground for not meeting the Teckal exception. The Court held that if, for the
duration of a contract, the capital of the controlled entity which has been
awarded that contract based on the Teckal in-house criteria is open to private
shareholders, the effect of such a situation would be the award of a public
contract to a semi-public company without any call for competition, which
would interfere with the objectives pursued by the procurement directives and
the principles of EU law.42
The combination of inferences found in Parking Brixen and ANAV should
be viewed as defence mechanisms in order to prevent abuse of the Teckal
exception, even when at the time of the award of an in-house public contract
there is no private sector participation in the capital of the controlled entity.
One could question that logic, as the Court reflected on situations where it
invited national courts to pay consideration to future privatization exercises or
opening up wholly owned public undertakings’ capital to private investors,
dictated by either law or regulation or selected as policy choices by the
contracting authority. Emphasis was drawn on the concept of institutional
public-private partnerships, where contracting authorities entrust the delivery
of public services. Additionally, prospective privatizations could cause
problems with the actual contractual arrangements, if ANAV is to apply to
in-house relations, when a contract is well into its delivery.
Sea43 appears to correct the potential problems deriving from ANAV. As a
general rule, the existence of a private holding in the capital of the company to
which a public contract is awarded must be determined at the time of that
award.44 Account should be taken in cases when national applicable
legislation provides for the compulsory opening of that company whose entire
capital it holds, in the short term, to other capital.45 However, when shares in
the contracting entity which were previously wholly owned by the contracting
authority, are transferred to a private undertaking shortly after the award of a
contract to that undertaking, the in-house exemption is not possible46 because
the transfer is viewed as an artificial device to circumvent public procurement
rules.
41. See Case C-410/04, Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v.
Comune di Bari, AMTAB Servizio SpA, [2006] ECR, I-3303.
42. Commission v. Austria, cited supra note 40, para 48
43. See Case C-573/07, Sea Srl. v. Comune di Ponte Nossa ECR [2009] I-8127.
44. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9, paras. 15 and 52.
45. Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32, paras. 67 and 72.
46. Commission v Austria, cited supra note 40, paras. 38–41.
CML Rev. 2012256 Bovis
Nevertheless, shares in a public company could be sold at any time to third
parties. It would be inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty not to
apply the in-house exemption on the mere possibility that the capital structure
of a publicly controlled company might change in the future.
If a company’s capital is wholly owned by the contracting authority, alone
or together with other public authorities, when the contract in question is
awarded to that company, the potential opening of the company’s capital to
private investors may not be taken into consideration unless there is, at that
time, a real prospect in the short term of such an opening.Therefore, when the
capital of the contracting company is wholly public and there is no actual sign
of any impending opening of that company’s capital to private shareholders,
themere fact that private undertakings, at some point in time, may hold capital
in that company could not support the conclusion that the condition relating to
the control by the public authority over the company is not present. That
conclusion is not contradictory to Coname47 which indicated that the fact that
a company is open to private capital prevents it from being regarded as a
structure for the “in-house” management of a public service on behalf of the
municipalities which form part of it. In that case, a public service was awarded
to a company in which not all, but most, of the capital was public, and so
mixed, at the time of the award.
Seamade clear that if a contract were to be awarded, without being put out
to competitive tender, to a public capital company, the fact that subsequently,
but still during the period for which that contract was valid, private
shareholders were permitted to hold capital in that company would constitute
alteration of a fundamental condition of the contract. This scenario would not
regard the contract as an in-house arrangement and it would require the full
applicability of the public procurement directives.
2.1.3.2. Operational dependency and contracting authorities
The Teckal second criterion specifies that an essential part of the controlled
entity’s activities must be carried out for the benefit of the controlling
contracting authority or authorities. Sea held that the control exercised over
that company by the shareholder authorities may be regarded as similar to the
control over their own departments when that company’s activity is limited to
the territory of those authorities and is carried on essentially for their benefit.
The Court maintained in Parking Brixen that, if the geographical area of the
activities has been extended to the entire country and abroad, the essential part
47. See Case C-29/04,ConsorzioAziendeMetano (Coname). v.Comune di Cingia de’Botti,
[2005] ECR I-7287, paras. 5 and 28.
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of the controlled entities’ activities cannot be carried out for the benefit of the
controlling public authority.
The “essential part” criterion relates to a certainminimum proportion of the
total activities performed by the controlled body. However, not only
quantitative elements must be taken into account in determining the term
“essential”. While it could be convenient to define the essential part criterion
in line with a provision governing awards to undertakings affiliated with the
contracting authority, namely the 80 percent criterion, such an approach has
been rejected by the Court on grounds that a transposition of an exceptional
provision from the Utilities Directive to the Public Sector Directive is of
questionable vires. Cabotermo48 provided interesting insights on operational
dependency. The Court declared that the 80 percent rule of affiliated
operational dependency cannot be imported into the public sector
procurement because that provision is regarded as a restrictively interpreted
exception applicable only to supply contracts, covering affiliated
undertakings which are distinctively different than public sector procurement
entities, being subject to a procedural notification regime which cannot be
implemented in public sector procurement directives and finally being
explicitly ignored by the EU legislature during the 2004 reform of the public
procurement directives from incorporation into the Public Sector Directive
2004/18.
So, although an “essential part” indicates a quantitative measure in relation
to turnover or financial quantum of the volume of activities performed by the
controlled entity, qualitative factors such as strategic services, organizational
planning, market analysis, the profitability of the entity in pursuit of the
activities for the controlling authority and also the market dynamics under
which the controlled entity operates should be taken into account. Cabotermo
also ruled that to determine whether an undertaking carries out the essential
part of its activities with the controlling authority, account must be taken of all
the activities which that undertaking carries out on the basis of an award made
by the contracting authority, regardless of who pays for those activities, and
irrespective of being the contracting authority itself or the user of the services
provided.The Court reiterated that the territorywhere the activities are carried
out is highly relevant for determining the essential part feature of the Teckal
exception.
If the public authority which receives an essential part of an entity’s
activities controls that entity through another company, the control criterion is
still present, provided that control is demonstrable at all levels of the
contracting authority’s corporate interface, being intermediate or indirect
shareholding levels.
48. Carbotermo, cited supra note 33.
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2.1.3.3. Public-public partnerships
A public authority has the possibility of performing the public interest tasks
conferred on it by using its own administrative, technical and other resources,
without being obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own
departments.49 That possibility for public authorities to use their own
resources to perform the public interest tasks conferred on them may be
exercised in cooperation with other public authorities.50
Commission v.Germany51 provided a superb demonstration of flexibility in
the hands of contracting authorities in relation to their freedom to organize and
deliver public services. Cooperation between independent contracting
authorities in the form of establishing an entity upon which no similar control
is exercised to that over their own departments, with a contract being entrusted
on behalf of the participant contracting authorities, can be deemed to meet the
criteria for an in-house exception, provided the remit of such public
cooperation exists in relation to a public task or service specified under Union
law and there is no intention to circumvent public procurement rules and the
contractual relation is not based on any pecuniary interest consideration nor
any payments between the entity and the participant contracting authorities
materialized. The Court used an analogy with Coditel Brabant52 where
contractual relations between inter-municipal cooperative societies whose
members are contracting authorities and a jointly controlled entity can be
deemed in-house.
2.2. The concept of public contracts
The existence of a public contract is a precondition for the application of the
public procurement directives.53 Public procurement law has configured the
49. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9, para 48.
50. See Case C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v.
TransformaciónAgraria SA (Tragsa) andAdministración del Estado, [2007] ECR I-2999, para
65.
51. See Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany, [2009] ECR I-4747.
52. Coditel Brabant, cited supra note 35.
53. See Art. 1(2)(a) of the Public Sector Directive. Public contracts are contracts for
pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more economic operators and one or
more contracting authorities and having as their object the execution of works, the supply of
products or the provision of services. Art. 1(2)(b) of the Public Sector Directive specifies as
public works contracts, contracts which have as their object either the execution or both the
design and execution, of works, or the completion, bywhatever means, of a work corresponding
to the requirements specified by the contracting authority. A work means the outcome of
building or civil engineering works taken as a whole which is sufficient of itself to fulfil an
economic or technical function. Art. 1(2)(c) of the Public Sector Directive specifies as public
supply contracts, contracts having as their object the purchase, lease, rental or hire purchase,
with or without option to buy, of products. A public contract having as its object the supply of
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meaning of a pubic contract. The determining factor is not how a public
contract is described in national laws, nor the legal regime (public or private)
that governs its terms and conditions, nor the intentions of the parties. The
crucial characteristics of a public contract, apart from the obvious written
format requirement, are: i) a pecuniary interest consideration given by a
contracting authority and ii) in return of a work, product or service which is of
direct economic benefit to the contracting authority.
2.2.1. Developments in the Court’s case law related to the concept of
public contracts
A functional application of the pecuniary interest consideration requirement
by the Court led to a variety of payment mechanisms being covered, such as
direct or deferred payment by the contracting authority to the economic
operator, commitment to lease-back an asset after its construction, asset swaps
between the contracting authority and the economic operator or conferral to
the economic operator of an exclusive right to collect third-party payments. In
Köln Messe,54 leasing and sub-leasing arrangements between the City of
Cologne and Grundstücksgesellschaft Köln Messe for the construction and
use for 30 years of four exhibition halls, ancillary buildings and relevant
infrastructure were regarded as pecuniary interest considerations.
The pecuniary interest consideration requirement is also indissolubly
linked with the ability of the contracting authority to specify the object of the
public contract. Requirements specified by contracting authorities include
measures which define the type of works, or action on the part of contracting
authorities which has decisive influence over the design of a project or the
execution of works. The means of execution are irrelevant, in the sense that
prime contracting or sub-contracting could be utilized for the fulfilment of the
contract’s object with no effect on contractual obligations or liability issues
arising form the public contract. Interestingly, the Court did not consider
urban planning conditions as specifications by a contracting authority capable
of attributing an immediate economic benefit, even if public interest is served
by such conditions.
Notably, planning gain contracts or contractual arrangements emanating
from planning decisions of contracting authorities are covered by the public
products and which also covers, as an incidental matter, placement and installation operations
must be considered as a public supply contract. Art. 1(2)(d) of the Public Sector Directive
specifies as public service contracts, contracts other than public works or supply contracts
having as their object the provision of services referred to inAnnex II of the Directive.A public
contract having as its object both products and services within the meaning ofAnnex II must be
considered as a “public service contract” if the value of the services in question exceeds that of
the products covered by the contract.
54. See Case C-536/07, Commission v. Germany, ECR I-10355.
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procurement directives, irrespective of the identity of the entity responsible
for their execution. The Court in Ordine degli Architetti ruled55 that the
conditions attached to planning permission to develop and deliver certain
infrastructure requirements specified by a contracting authority as a result of
its granting planning to a landowner are capable of generating contractual
obligations which are conducive to public contracts. However, the relationship
between the contracting authority and the landowner is not a public contract,
since the contacting authority does not have any choice over who is
responsible for the execution of the planning gain requirements, as the only
person responsible could be the landowner. That relation is regarded as a
mandate emanating from the contracting authority and obliges the landowner
to treat planning gain requirements as public contracts.
Commission v. France56 touched upon agency or representation relations
with the object of delegating project contracting between contracting
authorities and entities district from them or their internal departments. Such
relations are deemed public service contracts, provided a written agreement is
concluded between the contracting authority and the agent or representative
for pecuniary interest in return for agency or representation services, provided
the agent or representative is responsible for signature, project authorization
or payments to third parties on behalf of the contracting authority and does not
have sufficient autonomy in executive decisions to be considered as a
beneficiary of the contract’s objects.
Public contracts denote a demonstrable element of economic benefit or risk
directly attributable to the contracting authority. Features of direct economic
benefit include ownership of asset by a contracting authority, a legal right over
its use and future economic advantages enjoyed by the contracting authority or
risks assumed by the contracting authority in relation to the materialization of
a project. In Auroux,57 a dispute arose relating to a leisure centre in the French
town of Roanne, the design and execution of which was entrusted to a
semi-public urban development company without the prior issue of a call for
tenders. The project had some specific features in as much as only certain
parts of the proposed leisure centre were intended for the town itself, while
other parts were to be disposed of by the urban development company directly
to third parties, although the town was to contribute towards their financing,
take over those parts not disposed of at the end of the project, and bear the full
risk of any losses incurred. The Court held that an agreement by which a
contracting authority entrusts another contracting authority with the execution
55. Ordine degli Architetti and Others, cited supra note 10.
56. See Case C-264/03, Commission v. France, [2005] ECR I-8831.
57. See Case C-220/05, Jean Auroux and Others v. Commune de Roanne, [2007] ECR
I-385.
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of a work constitutes a public works contract, regardless of whether or not it is
anticipated that the first contracting authority will become the owner of all or
part of that work. Ownership of an asset is crucial only in determining work
concession contracts, for it is deemed necessary as the means to grant an
exclusive exploitation right to the concessionaire.
The Court thus maintained in Auroux that, even if national laws oblige the
conclusion of a contract with certain undertakings which are themselves
contracting authorities and are bound to use the provisions of the public
procurement directives to the award of any following sub-contractual
arrangements directly related to the former contract, contracting authorities
must regard the initial contract as a public contract and apply the procurement
directives to its award in order to preserve legal certainty and eliminate the
potential avoidance of the application of public procurement rules by division
of sub-contracts into lots below the relevant thresholds. It follows that the
contractual relation between two, ipso facto, contracting authorities is to be
regarded as a prime public contact, which can demonstrate a clear element of
economic benefit or of risk attributable to the contracting authority,
irrespective of the obligation imposed upon the second contracting authority
to apply the public procurement rules for the award of the relevant
sub-contracts.
Although it has obvious similarities with Commission v. Germany,58 in the
sense of public sector entities cooperating for the delivery of public projects,
Auroux differs fundamentally in that the German case introduced a genuine
public-public partnership relation, where the contractual interface was not
based upon pecuniary interest considerations nor was any payment
materialized in return for the delivery of the contract’s objects.
Auroux concerned a legislative gap in procurement for public works
contracts, in the sense that an analogous provision to Article 18 of the Public
Sector Directive, which covers public service contracts awarded by a
contracting authority to another contracting authority or an association of
contracting authorities on the basis of an exclusive right based on law,
regulation or administrative provision compatible with the Treaty, does not
exist within the framework of the provisions relevant to public works
contracts. The case showed that this can only be filled by the presence of the
dependency test, i.e. the Teckal criteria.
Auroux left open the issue of double tendering, as the Court did not address
the issue of consecutive procurement of prime public contracts and
subsequent sub-contracts.59 The Court, however, ruled that in order to
58. Commission v. Germany, cited supra note 51.
59. In its Interpretative Communication on Public-Private Partnerships COM(2007)6661,
the Commission is against double tendering requirements in the case of Institutional Public
CML Rev. 2012262 Bovis
determine the value of a public contract, account must be taken of the total
value of the works contract from the point of view of a potential tenderer,
including not only the total amounts to be paid by the contracting authority but
also all the revenue received from third parties. In cases of mixed public
contracts, a quantitative evaluation reflecting contract values is applicable to
the services / supplies divide, whereas a qualitative evaluation reflecting the
object of contract is conducive to the works / services divide. The object of
contract, which also reflects on the requirements and specification of
contracting authorities, represents that decisive classification factor for the
works/services divide.
TheCourt inHelmutMüller60 held that sales of assets or land by contracting
authorities to economic operators or other contracting authorities are not
deemed public contracts, as a public contract is based on a “purchasing”
capacity of contracting authorities and on the imperative of a contracting
authority in being able to determine standards and specifications suitable to
meet the conditions of immediate economic benefit. Thus, the sale of assets or
land is not a public contract, unless a directly related public contract to that
asset or land is imminent by the contracting authority or another contracting
authority, in which case the land or asset sale and the consecutive public works
should be viewed in their entirety as a public contract.
In Helmut Müller the Court reiterated that the concept of public works
contracts does not require that the works which are the subject of the contract
be materially or physically carried out for the contracting authority, provided
that they are carried out for that authority’s immediate economic benefit. The
Court restricted the conditions which reflect the direct economic benefit to a
contracting authority by inserting an element of functionality in the notion of
public contracts, and rendered the ownership of assets irrelevant to the
determination of direct economic benefit on the part of contracting
authorities. In fact, the necessary conditions to satisfy an immediate economic
benefit to contracting authorities reflect only on the legal right of a contracting
authority over the use of an asset or on the future economic advantages
enjoyed or risks assumed by the contracting authority in relation to the
relevant asset.
Helmut Müller revealed that the immediate economic benefit from a
concession contract to a contracting authority presupposes a significant
assumption of operational or functional risks by the concessionaire and a
different makeup of the pecuniary interest consideration, in that the
Private Partnerships, encouraging contracting authorities to consider en bock the selection of a
private partner and the sub-sequent award of works or services as a single contractual interface.
60. See Case C-451/08, Helmut Müller v. Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben, [2010]
ECR I-2673.
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concessionaire has the economic freedom to charge end-users or third parties
for a certain duration. The ability of an economic operator to obtain urban
planning permission does not reflect operational risk and the unlimited
duration of concessions could not be regarded as lawful.
2.2.2. Contracts below the thresholds of the directives
The Court’s settled case law61 has made clear that contracts below the
stipulated thresholds of the directives are excluded from their applicability.
Vestergaard62 showed that although such contracts are excluded from the
scope of public procurement directives, contracting authorities are
nevertheless bound to comply with the fundamental principles of theTreaty.63
Medipac-Kazantzidis64 confirmed that contracts below the stipulated
thresholds need to comply with the duty of transparency65 as well as the
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.66 In Correos67 the
Court ruled that even in the absence of any discrimination on grounds of
nationality, the principle of equal treatment is applicable to the award of public
contracts below the stipulated thresholds.68The principles of equal treatment
and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty
of transparency which enables contracting authorities to verify that those
principles are complied with. The duty of transparency imposed on
contracting authorities consists in ensuring a sufficient degree of advertising
to enable the relevant public contract to be opened up to competition and the
impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed.69
However, the application of the fundamental principles of the Treaty to
contracts below the stipulated thresholds is based on the assumption that the
61. See Joined Cases C-147 & 148/06, SECAP SpA and Santorso Soc. coop. arl, [2008]
ECR I-3565; see Case C-412/04, Commission v. Italy, [2008] ECR I-619, para 65.
62. See Case C-59/00 Vestergaard [2001] ECR I-9505.
63. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, para 60.
64. See Case C-6/0,5 Medipac-Kazantzidis AE v. Venizelio-Pananio (PE.S.Y. KRITIS),
[2007] ECR I-4557.
65. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, paras. 60 and 61;Vestergaard, cited supra note 62, paras.
20 and 21; Coname, cited supra note 47, paras. 16 and 17; Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32,
paras. 46–48.
66. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, para 60; Vestergaard, cited supra note 62, paras. 20 and
21; Commission v France, cited supra note 56, para 32;Medipac-Kazantzidis, cited supra note
64, para 33.
67. See Case C-220/06, Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de
Correspondencia v. Administración General del Estado, [2007] ECR I-12175.
68. Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32, para 48, and ANAV, cited supra note 41, para 20.
69. Parking Brixen, ibid., para 49, ANAV, ibid., para 21.
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contracts in question are of certain cross-border interest.70 The parameters
which could determine if a contract is likely to be of certain cross-border
interest and therefore attract economic operators from other Member States
comprise the contract’s estimated value in conjunction with its technical
complexity or the location of its execution. It is in principle for the contracting
authority concerned to assess whether there may be cross-border interest in a
contract whose estimated value is below the threshold laid down by the
procurement directives. However, such assessment should be subject to
judicial review.
It is permissible, nevertheless, for national legislation to lay down objective
criteria, at national or local level, stipulating certain cross-border interest for
public contracts which fall below the thresholds of the public procurement
directives. Such criteria could include, inter alia, the quantum of themonetary
value of a contract, or its strategic importance to economic operators, in
conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out. The projected
profitability to an economic operator from a sub-dimensional contract may
also be part of such criteria to determine certain cross-border interest for
public contracts.Where the financial returns in the relevant contracts are very
modest,71 the likelihood of a cross-border interest is considerably weakened.
However, in certain cases, the geography and the particular location of the
performance of a public contract could trigger cross-border interest, even for
low-value contracts.
The Court held that exclusion of sub-dimensional public contracts of
certain cross-border interest from the application of the fundamental rules and
general principles of the Treaty could undermine the general principle of
non-discrimination, could give rise to collusive conduct and anti-competitive
agreements between national or local undertakings, and finally could impede
the exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services.72
2.2.3. Annex II B Services Contracts
For Annex II B Services Contracts, which are also referred to as non-priority
public service contracts, the EU legislature assumed that contracts for such
services are not, in the light of their specific nature, of cross-border interest
such as to justify their award being subject to the conclusion of a tendering
procedure in accordance with the public procurement directives. For that
70. See Case C-507/03, Commission v. Ireland (An Post), [2007] ECR I-9777, para 29, and
Commission v. Italy, cited supra note 61, paras. 66 and 67.
71. Coname, cited supra note 47, para 20.
72. See Case C-79/01, Payroll and Others, [2002] ECR I-8923, para 26; Case C-442/02,
CaixaBank France, [2004] ECR I-8961, paras. 12 and 13; and Case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz,
[2006] ECR I-9521, para 46.
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reason, the Public Sector Directive merely imposes a requirement of publicity
after the award of such service contracts.
An Post73 touched on contracts concerning services which fall underAnnex
II B of the Public Sector Directive. The contracting authorities are bound only
by the obligation to define the technical specifications by reference to national
standards implementing European standards which must be given in the
general contract documents and to send a notice of the results of the award to
the EU Publications Office. The other procedural rules in the Public Sector
Directive, including those relating to the award procedures and award criteria
are, by contrast, not applicable to those contracts.
However, the limited advertisement requirements contained in the Public
Sector Directive for contracts relating to services within the ambit ofAnnex II
B cannot justify the absence of any transparency, especially when the relevant
contract is of certain cross-border interest. The Court held74 that if a contract
of certain cross-border interest is awarded to an undertaking located in the
same Member State as the contracting authority without any call for
competition, this action would amount to a difference in treatment to the
detriment of undertakings which are located in other Member States and
might be interested in that contract. Such a difference in treatment, by
excluding all undertakings located in other Member States, amounts to
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality75 and contravenes the
purpose of the public procurement directives to eliminate barriers to
intra-Union trade in accordance with the fundamental principles of Union law,
and in particular the right of establishment and the freedom to provide
services.76
2.2.4. Service concessions as public contracts
Telaustria77 recognized that concession services are contracts which are
excluded from the scope of public procurement directives by the fact that the
consideration provided by the contracting authorities to the concessionaire
consists in the latter obtaining the right to exploit for payment its own service.
Notwithstanding such exclusion, contracting authorities concluding
concession services are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the
73. Commission v. Ireland (An Post), cited supra note 70.
74. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, paras. 60 and 61, and Coname, cited supra note 47, para
17.
75. Coname, cited supra note 47, para 19.
76. University of Cambridge, cited supra note 9, para 16; Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction
[2001] ECR I-7725, para 32; and Case C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik
Planungs- GmbH (HI) and Stadt Wien, [2002] ECR I-5553, para 43.
77. Telaustria, cited supra note 10.
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Treaty, in general and, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination on the
ground of nationality and the duty of transparency. The latter is intended as
verification of compliance with the relevant Treaty principles and consists in
ensuring a degree of competitiveness in the award of such contracts, in
conjunction with a review process of the award procedure.
Coname78 held that the direct award by a municipality of a service
concession does not comply with the transparency principle if, without
necessarily implying an obligation to hold an invitation to tender,
undertakings located in other Member States were precluded from having
access to appropriate information with a view to expressing their interest in
obtaining that service concession. The Court held that infringement of the
duty of transparency triggers the potential infringement of the principles of
free movement of services and the right of establishment.
In Parking Brixen,79 the Court reiterated that public authorities concluding
services concessionsmust comply with the principle of non-discrimination on
grounds of nationality and the principle of equal treatment, which
conceptually correspond to the principles of the right of establishment and the
freedom to provide services.80 The Court has suggested that the right of
establishment and the freedom to provide services are specific expressions of
the principle of equal treatment.81 The prohibition on discrimination on
grounds of nationality is also a specific expression of the general principle of
equal treatment.82 The Court stated that the principle of equal treatment in
public procurement is intended to afford equality of opportunity to all
tenderers, regardless of their nationality.83 As a result, the principle of equal
treatment is applicable to public service concessions even in the absence of
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The principles of equal treatment
and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty
of transparency which enables the concession-granting public authority to
ensure that those principles are complied with and that a sufficient degree of
competition for the award of the service concession is maintained. Finally, the
transparency obligation ensures the imperative of reviewing the impartiality
of procurement procedures.84
Recourse to Article 106(1) TFEU (ex 86(1) EC) does not alter the
requirement for contracting authorities to comply with the principle of
transparency for service concessions, as the granting of special or exclusive
78. Coname, cited supra note 47.
79. Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32.
80. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, para 60; Coname, cited supra note 47, para 16.
81. See Case 3/88, Commission v. Italy, [1989] ECR 4035, para 8.
82. See Case 810/79, Überschär, [1980] ECR 2747, para 16.
83. See Case C-87/94, Commission v. Belgium, [1996] ECR I-2043, paras. 33 and 54.
84. Telaustria, cited supra note 10, paras. 61 and 62.
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rights by Member States must not contravene the Treaty rules on equal
treatment and the competition provisions.85
The essence of the definition of public service concessions under the public
procurement directives is that a service concession is a contract which meets
the definition of a service contract except for the fact that the consideration for
the provision of services consists either solely in the right to exploit the service
or in that right together with payment. That corresponds to the Court’s
criterion of remuneration which comes not from the public authority
concerned, but from sums paid by third parties. However, in addition, the
Court has stressed that an essential feature of a public service concession is
that the concession holder assumes the risk of operating the services in
question.86
The Court has given some further guidance on what kind and degree of
transfer of risk is required for a contract to be categorized as a service
concession. In Eurawasser,87 it ruled that in relation to a contract for the
supply of services, the fact that the supplier does not receive consideration
directly from the contracting authority, but is entitled to collect payment under
private law from third parties, is sufficient for that contract to be viewed as a
service concession, where the service provider assumes all, or at least a
significant share of the operating risk faced by the contracting authority, even
if that risk appears limited.
The Court thus took the view that what matters is not that the operating risk
should be significant in itself but that whatever risk is already assumed by the
contracting authority should be transferred, either fully or to a significant
extent, to the successful service provider. In Eurawasser, the Court expressly
considered the fact that the limitation of the risk relevant to the contract
derived from public regulations (common in the utilities sector) which were,
on the one hand, beyond the control of the contracting authority and, on the
other hand, such as to reduce the likelihood of any adverse effect on
transparency or competition.
2.3. Developments in the Court’s jurisprudence related to changes of
circumstances in public contracts
A change in the terms and conditions of a contract which was previously
awarded in accordancewith the public procurement directivesmay necessitate
85. Bovis, op. cit. supra note 3.
86. See Case C-382/05, Commission v. Italy [2007] ECR I-6657, para 34, and Case
C-437/07, Commission v Italy [2008] I-153*, para 29; see also Commission Interpretative
Communication on Concessions under Community Law, O.J. 2000, C 121/2.
87. See Case C-206/08, WAZV.Gotha v. Eurawasser Aufbereitungs, [2009] ECR I-8377.
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initiating fresh award procedures. In Pressetext,88 various changes were
introduced by the contracting authority, in particular instituting an internal
re-organization by transferring the contract to a subsidiary of the economic
operator that was carrying out the contract and waiving the right to terminate
contract for three years. Additionally, a rebate increase from 15 percent to 25
percent was set up to counterbalance the price conversion to Euro from the
domestic currency and a clause was introduced to update price indices. The
Court held that these changes were not sufficient to constitute a new award
under the procurement directives.
The key test appears to assert that amendments during the duration of an
awarded public contract necessitate new award procedures when they are
materially different in character from the original contract and therefore
demonstrate the intention of the parties to re-negotiate the essential
contractual terms. In practice, it is not easy to distinguish between material
and non-material amendments in a public contract. An amendment may be
regarded asmaterial when it would have extended significantly the duration of
the initial contract; when it would have allowed for admission of different
bidders or selection of a different bid in the original tender; when it extends the
scope of the contract considerably to encompass services not initially covered;
or when it changes the economic balance of the contract in favour of the
contractor. However, if the change in terms and conditions was foreseen in the
initial contract, such change is normally regarded as a variation of the
execution of the contract, thus not meriting fresh award procedures.
In Commission v. Germany (Ambulances)89 an extension of ambulance
services contract to a new area increasing its value by 15 percent was regarded
as a material change. In Wall,90 the change of sub-contractor, even with the
consent of the contracting authority and even if the possibility of such change
was provided for in contract, amounts to a material change, requiring a
re-tender, if the use of that sub-contractor was a decisive factor in the award
decision. In Commission v. Spain,91 contract changes effected in the period
between the contract notification notice in the O.J.E.U. and the award of the
contract are material when the final contract included additional works which
were not mentioned in the O.J.E.U. notice or tender specifications and when
they increase the value of the contract. The possibility of additional works not
constituting material changes in the terms and conditions of a contract is only
permitted if such additional works were envisaged in the O.J.E.U. notice
published by the contracting authority.
88. See Case C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, [2008] ECR I-4401.
89. See Case C-160/08, Commission v. Germany, [2010] ECR I-3713.
90. See Case C-91/08, Wall AG v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main, [2010] ECR I-2815.
91. See Case C-423/07, Commission v. Spain, [2010] ECR I-3429.
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Apost-award change in the financialmake-up of a contract, which results in
it being de-classified as a concession is also to be regarded asmaterial change.
So, if the contracting authority alters the method of remuneration of the
economic operator by substitution of the right to exploit the concession with
direct payment, a significant reduction in operational risk is effected, which
favours the concessionaire and takes away the two necessary criteria for
concessions, namely the assumption of operational risk by the concessionaire
and the total or partly payment by means of third-party or end user
contributions based on the concessionaire’s exclusive right of exploitation.
2.3.1. Developments in the Court’s case law on selection and award
procedures
In Lianakis92 the Court held that tenderers must be aware of “all the elements”
to be taken into account by the authority for identifying themost advantageous
offer, including their relative importance. The contracting authority cannot
applyweightings or sub-criteria that it has not previously brought to tenderers’
attention. The weightings and sub-criteria related to the evaluation procedure
leading to the award of a contract cannot be established or changed after the
submission of tenders. In Lianakis, the specific issue was the fusion of
selection and award criteria, an issue already clarified by the Court. The Court
has maintained93 that the examination of a contractor’s suitability based on its
technical capacity and qualifications and its financial and economic standing
may take place simultaneously with the award procedures of a contract.94
However, the two procedures (the suitability evaluation and bid evaluation) are
totally distinct processes, which should not be confused.95
In Lianakis, the contracting authority specified the bidder’s experience on
projects in last 3 years, as well as the bidder’s manpower and equipment and
the bidder’s ability to complete the project by deadline as award criteria. The
Court reiterated that award criteria cannot be “essentially linked to
the tenderer’s ability to perform the contract in question”, pointing that the
criteria used by the contracting authorities were in fact selection criteria in
order to establish suitability of interested tenderers, and they must relate to
financial standing and technical capability of interested tenderers. The Court
concluded that the public procurement directives prohibit selection criteria
from being used as award criteria and reminded contracting authorities that the
92. See Case C-532/06, Emm G. Lianakis AE v. Alexandroupolis, [2008] ECR I-251.
93. Beentjes, cited supra note 9.
94. See Case C-28/86, Bellini, [1987] ECR 3347.
95. See Case C-71/92, Commission v. Spain, [1993] ECR I-5923. Also, Beentjes, cited
supra note 9, paras. 15 and 16, where the simultaneous application of selection of tenders and
award procedures is not precluded, on condition that the two are governed by different rules.
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selection and award processes are two independent and separate process in a
public procurement and that a fusion of selection and award criteria infringes
public procurement rules.
In Commission v. Greece,96 a railway utility advertised a contract for
engineering services whereby non-Greek engineers were excluded since they
submitted qualifications different from those required for the relevant
contract. The Court ruled that the utility had confused selection and award
criteria and applied the Lianakis ruling verbatim. In Commission v. France97
the Court reiterated the exhaustive character of award procedures and ruled
against the French Public Procurement Code allowing for a special award
procedure for “definition contracts”, where the holder of an initial definition
contract was given preference for subsequent contracts. The Court mentioned
that the public procurement directives allow exhaustively the award
procedures permitted (open, restricted, competitive dialogue and negotiated)
and that the definition contract procedure was not a form of competitive
dialogue since it covered several different contracts.
2.3.2. Proportionality and exclusion grounds for tenderers
Contracting authorities may apply measures which result in exclusion of
private sector undertakings from participating in tendering procedures on
grounds of equal treatment and transparency, only if these measures are
proportionate. In Michaniki98 the Court ruled that Greek law prohibiting all
media companies from bidding for public contracts was unlawful, as it
contravenes the principle of freedom to provide services. Also, in Assitur99 it
ruled that Italian law prohibiting affiliates from the same group from
submitting separate bids in a tendering procedure contravenes the public
procurement directives; finally, in Serrantoni100 it held that a ban on a
consortium participating in the same tender as members of that consortium
was against the spirit and letter of the procurement directives and the
underlying EU law principle of freedom to provide services.
96. See Case C-199/07, Commission v. Greece, [2009] ECR I-10669.
97. See Case C-299/08 Commission v. France, [2009] ECR I-11587.
98. See Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos
Epikratias and others, [2008] ECR I-9999.
99. See Case C-538/07, Assitur Srl v. Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e
Agricoltura di Milano, [2009] ECR I-4219
100. See Case C-376/08, Serrantoni Srl and Consorzio stabile edili Scrl v. Comune di
Milano, [2009] ECR I-12169.
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3. The traction of the remedies directives in public procurement
3.1. Enforcement of public procurement directives
The old Remedies Directives101 brought a decentralized dimension into the
application of public procurement rules. The Remedies Directives suffered
from serious shortcomings, in the sense that they did not provide for effective
review procedures between the stages of contract award and contract
conclusion respectively. That gave rise to direct awards and the so-called race
to sign the relevant contract to assume immunity from any redress based on the
pacta servanta sunt principle. In addition, at both pre-contractual and
post-contractual stages there were no effective deterrents for breach of either
procedural or substantive public procurement laws. Finally, the much
publicized attestation and conciliation procedures, which were branded as
innovative compliance solutions were not used by Member States and
contracting authorities.
The new amending Remedies Directive102 is predominately based on the
previous instruments but it introduced new themes such as a clear divide
between pre-contractual and post-contractual stages, a balance between
effective review of public contracts and need of efficient public procurement,
a strict standstill requirement for contract conclusion, including direct awards
by contracting authorities, extensive communication and monitoring
requirements and a substantial refocus of the corrective mechanism. The
amending Remedies Directive repealed the attestation and conciliation
procedures which was laid down by its predecessors and extended its coverage
to countries of the EEA.
The Court has used three principles to address issues relevant to the traction
of the Remedies Directives and the judicial review of public contracts; on the
one hand, the principle of procedural autonomy and, on the other hand, the
principle of effectiveness and the principle of procedural equality.
3.2. The principle of procedural autonomy
The principle of procedural autonomy affords discretion to Member States to
organize public procurement review procedures in alignment with national
review procedures.
101. See the public sector Remedies Directive 89/665 O.J. 1989, L 395/33, and the utilities
Remedies Directive 92/13, O.J. 1992, L 76/14.
102. See Directive 2007/66/EC, O.J. 2007, L335/31.
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3.2.1. Time limits to enact review proceedings
Member States have wide discretion to establish the procedural framework for
review procedures and the logistics for their operation. The existence of
national legislation which provides that any application for review of
decisions of contracting authorities must be commenced within a specific
time-limit and that any irregularity in the award procedure relied upon in
support of such application must be raised within the same period is
compatible with public procurement acquis,103 provided that, in pursuit of
fundamental principle of legal certainty, such specific time limits are
reasonable.104
3.2.2. Ex proprio motu investigation of the unlawfulness of decisions
National courts responsible for hearing review procedures in actions brought
by aggrieved tenderers, with the ultimate aim of obtaining damages, may
declare of their own motion the unlawfulness of a decision of the contracting
authority other than the one contested by the tenderer.105 However, a tenderer
harmed by a decision to award a public contract, whose lawfulness he is
contesting, cannot be denied the right to claim damages for the harm caused by
that decision on the grounds that the award procedure was in any event
defective owing to the unlawfulness, raised ex proprio motu, of another
decision of the contracting authority. Therefore, national courts cannot
dismiss an application for damages on the ground that the award procedure
was in any event unlawful and that the harm which the tenderer may have
suffered would therefore have been caused even in the absence of the
unlawfulness alleged by the tenderer.
3.2.3. Admissibility requirements of interim measures
Interim measures represent an autonomous legal remedy which must remain
unconditional to any other judicial review process.Their objective is to correct
the alleged infringement or prevent further damage to the interests concerned,
suspend or ensure the suspension of the procedure for the award of a public
contract, and finally suspend or ensure the suspension of the implementation
of any decision taken by the contracting authority. Interim measures are
granted with reference to a balance test which takes into consideration the
likely consequences of such measures for all parties liable to be harmed and
the public interest.
103. Universale-Bau, cited supra note 9.
104. See Case C-261/95, Palmisani, [1997] ECR I-4025, para 28, and Case C-78/98,
Preston and Others, [2000] ECR I-3201, para 33.
105. GAT & ÖSAG, cited supra note 10.
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The Court examined106 the conditionality of an application for interim
measures upon a prior action to set aide or annul an act or a decision of a
contracting authority and ruled against such a requirement on the grounds that
it restricts interim judicial protection by making the suspension of an
administrative act procedurally conditional on bringing an action for the
annulment of the contested act.107
The Court maintained that not only actions against definitive acts but also
procedural acts, should be allowed to be suspended by the application of
interimmeasures, if they determine, directly or indirectly, the substance of the
case, or bring an end to the award procedures for a public contract, or cause
irreparable harm to legitimate rights of interested parties. The Remedies
Directive does not provide for any derogation regarding the possibility of
appeal against procedural acts, or administrative measures which do not bring
administrative proceedings to an end.108
3.2.4. The failure to participate in the contract award procedure
Member States are not obliged to make review procedures available to any
person wishing to obtain a public contract, but instead, require that the person
concerned has been or risks being harmed by the alleged infringement.109 In
that sense, participation in a contract award procedure may validly constitute
a condition which must be fulfilled before the person concerned can show an
interest in obtaining the contract at issue or that he risks suffering harm as a
result of the allegedly unlawful nature of the decision to award that contract.
3.3. The principle of effectiveness
The principle of effectiveness of review procedures under the Remedies
Directive covers the ability of aggrieved tenderers to set aside decisions of
contracting authorities taken unlawfully or to remove discriminatory
technical, economic or financial specifications in the invitation to tender, the
contract documents or in any other document relating to the contract award
106. See C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, cited supra note 13 ; C-236/95, Commission v.
Greece [1996] ECR I-4459.
107. Commission v Greece, cited supra note 106.
108. See Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria and Others, [1999] ECR I-7671. The exclusion of
review of procedural acts is embedded in EU case law. See Case C-282/95,Guérin automobiles
v.Commission [1997] ECR I-1503.TheCourt has also held that the preparatory nature of the act
against which the action is brought is one of the grounds of inadmissibility of an action for
annulment, and that the Court may examine this of its own motion, see Case C-346/87, Bossi v.
Commission, [1989] ECR 303.
109. See Case C-249/01, Hackermüller, [2003] ECR I-6319, para 18.
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procedure. Set aside procedures are deemed as a legitimate conditional
remedy for the award of damages.
3.3.1. Standstill period
The standstill period is viewed as the answer to prevent the so-called race to
sign a public contract and as the mechanism to allow interested parties to
launch review procedures.110
3.3.2. Ineffectiveness
The threat of ineffectiveness deters the award of public contracts in breach of
the relevant directives and offers a great deal of discretion in the hands
of national law.111 Ineffectiveness may result in retrospective cancellation of
contractual obligations, or reduction of contractual obligations or appropriate
penalties in the sense of fines levied on contracting authorities or shortening
of concluded public contracts. Grounds for deviation from ineffectiveness
reflect overriding reasons relating to a general interest and must be subject to
alternative penalties.
Economic interests may, in exceptional circumstances, be overriding
reasons due to the disproportionate consequences arising from the contract’s
ineffectiveness. Economic interests directly linked to the contract such as
costs resulting from the delay in the execution of the contract, costs resulting
from the launching of a new procurement procedure, costs resulting from the
change of the economic operator and costs of legal obligations resulting from
the ineffectiveness are not deemed overriding reasons.
3.3.3. Obligation to allow sufficient time between contract award and
conclusion
Member States are required to provide for a review procedure so that an
applicant may have set aside a decision of a contracting authority to award a
public contract to a third party, prior to the conclusion of the contract.112 That
right of review for tenderers must be independent of the possibility for them to
110. See Art. 2 (a) of Directive 2007/66 which stipulates a standstill requirement for 10
calendar days from the day following day of award decision if fax or electronic means are used,
or 15 calendar days from the day following day of award decision if other means of
communication are used, or 10 calendar days from the day following the date of the receipt of
the contract award decision.
111. See Art. 2d(1) and Art. 2f of Directive 2007/66 which lays down that Member States
may provide that application for review regarding ineffectiveness of contracts must be made
before 30 calendar days after publication of contract award notice, provided that decisions of
contracting authority to award contract without prior publication of contract noticewas justified
or in any case before expiry of period of at least six months after conclusion of contract.
112. See Case C-212/02,Commission v.Austria, judgment of 24 June 2004 (not published).
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bring an action for damages once the contract has been concluded.113 A
national legal system that makes it impossible to contest the award decision,
because the award decision and the conclusion of the contract occur at the
same time, deprives interested parties of any possible review in order to have
an unlawful award decision set aside or to prevent the contract from being
concluded. Complete legal protection requires that a reasonable period must
elapse between the decisionwhich awards a public contract and the conclusion
of the contract itself, as well as a duty on the part of contracting authorities to
inform all interested parties of an awarding decision.
3.3.4. Meaning and content of decisions for review
The Court verified that any remedies available to interested parties against
decisions of contracting authorities extends also to decisions taken outside a
formal award procedure and decisions prior to a formal call for tenders,114
such as decisions onwhether a particular contract falls within the personal and
material scope of the public procurement directives, as well as decisions to
withdraw invitations to tender and abort public procurement procedures.115
The Remedies Directives preclude national legislation which limits review of
the legality of the withdrawal of an invitation to tender to mere examination of
whether it was arbitrary. However, the Court has defined the scope of the
obligation to notify reasons for abandoning the award of a contract,116 which
must be limited to exceptional cases or must necessarily be based on serious
grounds.117 Although a contracting authority is required to notify candidates
and tenderers of the grounds for its decision if it withdraws the invitation to
tender, there is no implied obligation on that authority to carry the award
procedure to its conclusion.
The broad meaning of the concept of a decision taken by a contracting
authority is confirmed by the Court’s case law. The Court has held that there
is no restriction with regard to the nature and content of the decisions taken by
contracting authorities.118 Nor could such a restriction be inferred from the
wording of the Remedies Directives. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of
the concept of a decision amenable to review would be incompatible with the
requirement that Member States provide for interim relief procedures in
relation to any decision taken by the contracting authorities.119 On the other
113. Alcatel Austria, cited supra note 108, para 43.
114. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9.
115. Hospital Ingenieure, cited supra note 76, para 55.
116. See O.J. 1993, L 199/54.
117. See Case C-27/98, Fracasso and Leitschutz v. Salzburger Landesregierung, [1999]
ECR I-5697, paras. 23 and 25.
118. Alcatel Austria , cited supra note 108, paras. 32–35.
119. Hospital Ingenieure , cited supra note 76, para 49.
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hand, decisions or acts of contracting authorities which constitute a mere
preliminary study of the market or which are purely preparatory and form part
of the internal reflections of the contracting authority with a view to a public
award procedure are not amenable to review.120 The Court has held that the
contracting authority’s decision prior to the conclusion of the contract as to the
tenderer to whom the contract will be awarded must in all cases be open to
review, regardless of the possibility of obtaining an award of damages once the
contract has been concluded.121
3.3.5. Locus standi and interest to review acts
Fritsch Chiari122 precludes the conditionality of locus standi upon prior
participation of aggrieved tenderers in conciliation procedures as
incompatible with the effectiveness principle, thus recognizing the
autonomous and unconditional character of judicial review procedures in
public procurement. Even though Member States are free to determine the
detailed rules according to which they must make the review procedures
provided for in the Remedies Directive available to any person having or
having had an interest in obtaining a particular public contract and who has
been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement,123 they cannot
interpret the term interest in obtaining a public contract strictly.124 Thus, a
person who has participated in a contract award procedure, but subsequently
failed to initiate pre-judicial proceedings, such as conciliation or mediation
proceedings, to review an act or decision of a contracting authoritymust not be
regarded as having lost his interest in obtaining the contract and therefore
being precluded from lodging an action to contest the legality of the contract
awarding decision or any decision of the contracting authority.125
Persons to whom review procedures must be available must include, at
least, any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a public
contract126 who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.127
The formal capacity of tenderer or candidate is not thus required.128The Court
120. See the Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl in Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9, paras. 23–29.
121. Alcatel Austria, cited supra note 108, para 43.
122. See Case C-410/01, Fritsch, Chiari & Partner, Ziviltechniker GmbH and Others and
Autobahnen- und. Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG. (Asfinag), [2003] ECR I-11547.
123. See Case C-327/00, Santex SpA v.Unità Socio Sanitaria Locale n. 42 di Pavia, [2003]
ECR I-1877, para 47.
124. Fritsch Chiari, cited supra note 122, paras. 31 and 34.
125. See Case C-230/02, Grossmann Air Service, Bedarfsluftfahrtunternehmen GmbH &
Co. KG and Republik Österreich, [2004] ECR I-1829.
126. Stadt Halle, cited supra note 9.
127. Commission v. Austria, cited supra note 112.
128. Grossmann, cited supra note 125.
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maintained that an assessment of an aggrieved tenderer’s interest in reviewing
a decision or an act of a contracting authority should be examined in light of
the fact that he did not participate in the contract award procedure and did not
appeal against the invitation to tender before the award of the contract.
Grossmann129 confirmed the existence of interest in obtaining a contract
where no bid has been submitted.The Court held that it must be possible for an
undertaking to seek review of discriminatory specifications before submitting
a bid and without waiting for the contract award procedure to be terminated,
but a refusal to acknowledge interest in obtaining a contract of a person who
has not participated in the contract award procedure or has not sought review
against the invitation to tender does not impair the effectiveness of the
Remedies Directives.
Espace Trianon130 recognized the existence of both collective and
individual interest in obtaining a contract in cases of consortia participation in
public procurement procedures and the Court held that not only all the
members of a consortium without legal personality which has participated in
a procedure for the award of a public contract and has not been awarded that
contract, acting together, may bring an action against the decision awarding
the contract, but locus standi is recognized evenwhere only onemember of the
consortium seeks review. Interestingly, if the application of one of the
consortium members is held inadmissible, locus standi of the other members
of the consortium is not affected.
Elisoccorso/Elilombarda131 repeated the Espace Trianon ruling by
confirming the existence of individual interest and reaffirming the eligibility
of an aggrieved individual member of a consortium without legal personality
to contest a decision or an act of a contracting authority in relation to the award
of a public contract.
3.4. The principle of procedural equality
The principle of procedural equality (or equivalence) obliges Member States
to treat public procurement review procedures equally to domestic review
procedures.
129. Grossmann, cited supra note 125.
130. See Case C-129/04,EspaceTrianon SA and Société wallonne de location-financement
SA (Sofibail) v.Office communautaire et régional de la formation professionnelle et de l’emploi
(FOREM), [2005] ECR I-7805.
131. See Case C-492/06, Consorzio Elisoccorso San Raffaele v. Elilombarda Srl and
Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale Niguarda Ca’Granda di Milano, [2007] ECR I-8189.
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3.4.1. Time limits to decide review of acts or decisions
The period for assessing the legality of act or decisions of contracting
authorities132 remains within the discretion of Member States, subject to the
requirement that the relevant national rules are not less favourable than those
governing similar domestic actions.133
In Universale Bau,134 Austrian procurement rules stipulated limitation
periods within which certain allegedly unlawful decisions had to be
challenged. The Court declared that the Remedies Directives do not provide
for any specific limitation periods and that, in the absence of EU rules,
Member States are free to set procedural rules if they comply with
fundamental principles of EC Treaty. The Court considered a two-week
limitation period in principle consistent with principles of effectiveness and
equivalence and reflecting an element of appropriateness in the light of their
overall objective.135
Sanetex136 concerned Italian law providing that an invitation to tender or
clauses thereof must be challenged within the limitation period of sixty days;
when that period had expired, a challenge was no longer possible. An
aggrieved bidder did not challenge a specific (potentially discriminatory)
clause because the contracting authority led him to believe that the disputed
clause would be interpreted in a non-discriminatory manner. After the elapse
of the time limitation period, the contracting authority excluded the bidder
from the tender procedure on basis of the potentially discriminatory clause.
The Court considered the 60 days limitation period as being reasonable, but
held that the changed conduct of the contracting authority had rendered the
exercise of the rights conferred on tenderer excessively difficult
(effectiveness). The latter requirement requires national courts to interpret
domestic law in a way which might not apply or might extend
limitation-periods which render redress excessively difficult.
In Lämmerzahl,137 the Court dealt with an application for review being
deemed inadmissible where no complaint was raised about infringements that
are identifiable in the contract notice by, at the latest, the end of the period for
submission of bids. The Court held that a contract notice lacking any
information as to the estimated contract value followed by evasive conduct of
132. Hospital Ingenieure, cited supra note 76.
133. See Case C-390/98, Banks v Coal Authority and Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry [2001] ECR I-6117, para 121; Case C-453/99,Courage v.Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297,
para 29.
134. Universale-Bau, cited supra note 9.
135. See Case C-231/96, EDIS, [1998] ECR I-4951.
136. Santex, cited supra note 123.
137. See Case C-241/06, Lämmerzahl GmbH v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [2007] ECR
I-8415.
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the contracting authority must, in view of a limitation period, be seen as
rendering excessively difficult the exercise by the tenderer concerned of rights
conferred on him by EC law
In Uniplex138 the Court confirmed that any periods laid down for bringing
proceedings start to run only from the date on which claimant knew or ought
to have known of alleged infringement; a contracting authority must notify
unsuccessful candidates of the relevant reasons or at least a summary of its
decision in relation to the award of a public contract. The Court had to rule on
the compatibility of UK law which provides that “proceedings must be
brought promptly and in any event within three months from the date when
grounds for the bringing of the proceedings first arose unless the Court
considers there is a good reason for extending the period within which
proceedings may be brought”. The Court held that the UK provisions give rise
to legal uncertainty as the limitation period, the duration of which is at the
discretion of the competent court, is not predictable in its effects and national
courts are bound to interpret national law that transposes a directive in the
light of the wording and purpose of the directive, i.e. in a way that the period
begins to run from the date on which the claimant knew or ought to have
known of the infringement. If national law does not arrive at such an
interpretation the national court is bound to extend the period for bringing
proceedings in relation to the award of public contracts.
The Court upheld the Uniplex ruling in Commission v. Ireland,139 where
national law provided that application for review of a decision to award a
contract shall be made “at the earliest opportunity and in any event within
three months from the date when grounds for the bringing of the proceedings
first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending
such period”. The Court maintained that the national limitation periods are to
be interpreted by national courts as to apply not only to the final decision to
award the contract but also to preparatory acts or interim decisions and that
national rules need to be unequivocally clear and beyond doubt as to the time
from which the limitation period starts to run.
The principle of effectiveness underpinned Commission v. Germany,140
where the Court confirmed that the Commission, as guardian of Treaty, has
absolute discretion to initiate compliance proceedings for failure to
implement EU law against a Member State even if limitation periods under
national law have expired.
138. See Case C-406/08, Uniplex (UK) Ltd v. NHS Business Services Ltd., [2010] ECR
I-817.
139. See Case C-456/08, Commission v. Ireland, [2010] ECR I-859
140. See Case C-17/09, Commission v. Germany, [2010] ECR I-4*.
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3.4.2. Admissibility requirements of interim measures
National provisions concerning the possibility of launching interim measures
against acts or decisions of contracting authorities must not be specific to the
award of public contracts, but apply equally to all procedures.141 National
legislation which restricts judicial protection in public procurement disputes
through the conditional application of interim measures, such that interested
parties must bring an action for the annulment of the contested act of a
contracting authority first, is in contradiction with the principle of procedural
equality.
3.4.3. Damages
Award of damages in public procurement is limited to persons economically
harmed by an infringement on the part of the contracting authority. After
conclusion of contract, damages represent the only remedy available. The
Remedies Directive contains no further requirements as to the burden of proof
or method of calculation. The national legislature, although free to decide,
must comply with the principle of equivalence and the principle of
effectiveness. The degree of effective award of damages in breach of public
procurement law varies enormously within the legal orders of the Member
States. The effectiveness is different where courts can grant punitive damages
or award damages according to the principle of likelihood of harm, compared
with legal systems requiring proof that the contract would have been awarded
to a particular tenderer. Difficulties also arise in cases where no bid was
submitted or in cases of direct awards, where the award criteria did not require
that a notice was published or no tender procedure was carried out.
InCommission v.Germany,142 the Court recognized that the principle pacta
servanda sunt and the prospect of damages litigation for termination of
illegally awarded contracts cannot act as defence of contracting authorities for
not rescinding illegally awarded contracts. German municipalities concluded
services contracts for a term of at least 30 years without publishing notices.
Germany argued that the breach had happened and was subsequently
exhausted by conclusion of the contracts, and that after conclusion of the
relevant contracts there was no longer actual breach. The Court held that the
effects of unlawful contract awards go beyond the conclusion of contract
because of its long duration and that a breach of obligations under the public
procurement directives and EU law is an active breach as long as the
unlawfully concluded contract is valid.
141. Commission v Greece, cited supra note 106.
142. See Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-28/01,Commission v.Germany, [2003] ECR I-3609.
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InWall / Frankfurt,143 the Court held that the principles of equal treatment
and non-discrimination and the consequent obligation of transparency do not
require the national authorities to terminate a contract or grant a restraining
order in every case of an alleged breach of that obligation in connection with
the award of service concessions. But it is for the national law to regulate the
legal procedures for safeguarding the rights which individuals derive from the
transparency obligation in such way that those procedures are no less
favourable than similar domestic procedures, according to the principle of
equivalence, and they do not make the exercise of those rights practically
impossible or excessively difficult, according to the principle of effectiveness.
In Portugal, domestic lawmade the award of damages to persons harmed by
a breach of EU procurement law conditional on proof of fault or fraud on the
part of the contracting authorities, a fact which substantially reduced the
likelihood of aggrieved tendreres in obtaining damages. The Court
pronounced that such conditionality contravenes the principle of effectiveness
of Remedies Directives.144
In Aktor ATE / ESR,145 the Court expanded de lege ferenda the coverage of
the Remedies Directives to bodies which are not contracting authorities but
their decisions are capable of having a certain effect on the outcome of a
procurement procedure. The Court found that the national law did not comply
with principles of equivalence and effectiveness, as it rendered impossible to
seek annulment of a decision and to obtain compensation for any damage
incurred, whereas this was not the case in other areas of national law
applicable to damages incurred by virtue of unlawful acts of public
authorities. As a result, those bodies should be deemed as contracting
authorities, by applying the functionality test, and their decisions or acts in
relation to public procurement procedures must be subject to review
procedures to satisfy the effectiveness principle of the Remedies Directive.
The Court reiterated that in the absence of EU rules governing damages it is
for each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to lay
down detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights
which individuals derive from EU law as long as they are not less favourable
than those governing similar domestic actions in accordancewith the principle
of equivalence.
143. Wall AG, cited supra note 90.
144. Case C-275/03, Commission v. Portugal, Case C-70/06, Commission v. Portugal,
[2008] ECR I-1.
145. See Joined Cases C-145 & 149/08, Club Hotel Loutraki AE and Others v. Ethnico
Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias and Aktor Anonymi Techniki Etaireia
(Aktor ATE) v. Ethnico Symvoulio Radiotileorasis, [2010] ECR I-4165.
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4. The porosity of the public procurement directives
4.1. Exhaustive harmonization: The enemy within
Exhaustive harmonization in the public procurement directives has surfaced
as their strategic shortcoming and has resulted in the porosity of their legal
effect. Exhaustive harmonization de lege lata excludes or limits from the
scope of the public procurement directives public contracts below certain
thresholds or certain services contracts. However, the lex specialis character
of public procurement directives undermines their effectiveness by preventing
their applicability to certain contractual situations and as a result restricting a
de lege ferenda extension of their provisions.146
The effects of exhaustive harmonization in the procurement directives
expose their inability to regulate contractual relationships which mimic
inter-administrative interfaces in the public sector or contractual relations
based on dominant influence between utilities and affiliated undertakings.
These contractual relations can be classified under five broad categories: i)
service concessions ii) public service contracts awarded by a contracting
authority or entity to another contracting authority or an association of
contracting authorities on the basis of an exclusive right based on law,
regulation or administrative provision compatible with the Treaty; iii) public
contracts awarded by utilities to their affiliated entities, upon which they
exercise dominant influence; iv) in-house contractual relations between
contracting authorities and public entities or undertakings upon which the
former exercise control similar to that exercised over their own departments
and the controlled entities are operationally dependent on them; v) public
service contracts relating to services of general economic interest or having
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly in accordance with Article
106(2) TFEU (ex 86(2) EC).
The porosity of the public procurement directives in relation to contractual
relations which are regarded as the by-product of exhaustive harmonization
situations relate to service concessions, inter-administrate public contracts
based on exclusive rights, public contracts in pursuit of services of general
economic interest and in-house contracts, which result in direct awards and
escape the applicability of the directives and to non-priority services contracts
and contracts with values below the stipulated thresholds, which attract a
limited applicability of the directives.
Nevertheless, exhaustive harmonization by lex specialis legal instruments
such as the public procurement directives cannot impose limits on the
application of primary EU law to supplement their legal thrust. The need for
146. See Bovis, op. cit. supra note 5.
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conformity with EU law is evident even in cases beyond exhaustive
harmonization and with respect to excluded contracts from the public
procurement directives.The Public Sector Directive and theUtilities Directive
provide for mutual exclusivity of their provisions147 as well as their
non-applicability in cases of public contracts awarded pursuant to
international rules,148 or secret contracts and contracts requiring special
security measures or contracts related with the protection of Member States’
essential interests.149 The Public Sector Directive also does not cover public
contracts whose object is to provide or exploit public telecommunications
networks;150 contracts for the acquisition or rental or land; contracts related to
broadcasting services; contracts related to financial securities, capital raising
activities and central bank services; employment contracts; and research and
development contracts which do not benefit the relevant contacting
authority.151 The Utilities Directive does not apply to contracts awarded in a
third country;152 contracts awarded by contracting entities engaged in the
provision or operation of fixed networks for the purchase of water and for the
supply of energy or of fuels for the production of energy;153 contracts subject
to special arrangements for the exploitation and exploration of oil, gas, coal or
other solid fuels by virtue of European law;154 contracts and framework
agreements awarded by central purchasing bodies;155 contracts whose object
activity is directly exposed to competition on markets to which access is not
restricted156 and contracts related to works and service concessions157 which
are awarded by contracting entities carrying out one or more of the activities
covered by the Utilities Directive, in particular activities including gas, heat
and electricity, water, transport services, postal services, exploration for oil,
gas or other solid fuels, extraction of oil, gas or other solid fuels and provision
of ports and airports where those concessions are awarded for carrying out
those activities.
Reliance on the conditions for exclusion of contracts from the applicability
of the directives is to be determined by the European Commission, by virtue of
extensive publication and communication requirements imposed upon
147. See the Utilities Directive 2004/17, cited supra note 6.
148. See Art. 15 of the Public Sector Directive 2004/18, cited supra note 6, and Art. 22(a)
of the Utilities Directive.
149. See Art. 14 of the Public Sector Directive and Art. 21 of the Utilities Directive.
150. See Art. 13 of the Public Sector Directive.
151. See Art. 16 of the Public Sector Directive.
152. See Art. 20(1) of the Utilities Directive.
153. See Art. 26(a) of the Utilities Directive.
154. See Art. 27 of the Utilities Directive.
155. See Art. 29(2) of the Utilities Directive.
156. See Art. 30(1) of the Utilities Directive.
157. See Art. 30(6) third indent of the Utilities Directive.
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contracting authorities and Member States. Such limitations could be viewed
as inhibiting factors inMember States’ freedom and autonomy to organize and
deliver public services and as mistrust on their part to effectively comply with
the public procurement acquis.
4.2. The treatment of porosity
The Court has recognized the lacuna in the effectiveness of the procurement
directives and particularly in areas which cannot de lege ferenda be conducive
to regulatory control. Although the application of primary EU law is not
precluded in the presence of exhaustive provisions of secondary law,158 the
Court explicitly recognized that the lex specialis character of the procurement
directives aims at complementing fundamental freedoms of EU law in respect
of intra-community trade in public contracts.
The Court reacted to the porosity of the directives with two conceptual
actions. The first signals the necessity to supplement their remit with the
acquis deriving from fundamental principles of EU law, whereas the second
manifests the need to increase compliance by contracting authorities by
promoting the objectivity of the procurement directives and enhancing their
justiciability, whilst in parallel limiting their inherent flexibility. Thus, the
applicability of primary EU law intends to close the gap that exists in contracts
falling outside the procurement directives, such as service concessions.159 As
for contracts which fall within the remit of the directives, but escape from the
full thrust of the principles enshrined therein, such as sub-dimensional
contracts and non-priority services contracts, primary EU law, in particular
the fundamental freedoms also apply.160
158. See Case C-37/92, Vanacker and Lesage, [1993] ECR I-4947, para 9; Case C-324/99,
DaimlerChrysler, [2001] ECR I-9897, para 32; and Case C-322/01, Deutscher
Apothekerverband, [2003] ECR I-14887, para 64.
159. Coname, cited supra note 47, para 16, and Commission v. France, cited supra note 56,
para 32.
160. See Case C-45/87, Commission v. Ireland, [1988] ECR I-4929, para 27, where the
Court held that the inclusion in the contract specification of a clause stipulating exclusively the
use of national specifications infringe Art. 30 EC; Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark
(Storebælt), [1993] ECR I-3353, where the Court found that contract clauses concerning
preference to national specifications and nominated sub-contractors infringe Arts. 30, 48 and
59 EC; Case C-158/03, Commission v. Spain, and Case C234/03, Contse and Others, [2005]
ECR I-9315, where the content of tendering specifications, and in particular sub-criteria for the
award of contracts ran contrary to Art. 49 EC; Hospitale Ingenieure, cited supra note 76, para
42, where the Court ruled that contracting authorities’ decisions are subject to fundamental
rules of EU law, and in particular to the principles on the right of establishment and the freedom
to provide services; Case C-244/02,Kauppatalo Hansel Oy, [2003] ECR I-12139, paras. 31 and
33, where the Court confirmed the principle underwhich primary law is to be taken into account
in a supplemental capacity for evaluating the effectiveness of the public procurement directives;
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TheCourt dealt with the porosity of the public procurement directives using
the principle of transparency. The principle of transparency embraces the
fundamental EU law principles which are applicable to public procurement,
such as the free movement of goods, the right of establishment and the
freedom to provide services, as well as the principle of non-discrimination and
its surrogate principle of equal treatment. The Court’s case law shows the
close link between transparency and the principle of equal treatment.
Transparency intends to ensure the effectiveness of equal treatment in public
procurement by guaranteeing the conditions for genuine competition. As the
principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, Member States
are required to comply with the duty of transparency, which constitutes a
concrete and specific expression of that principle.The Court has seen the duty
of transparency as representing a concrete and specific expression of the
principle of equal treatment, one of the fundamental principles of EU law,161
which the Member States must observe when they act within the scope of EU
law. The principle of equal treatment assumes that similar situations should
not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified.162
The Court had the opportunity to define the scope of the principle of equal
treatment in the context of public procurement inCommission v.Denmark and
Commission v. Belgium.163 The Court held that compliance with the principle
of equal treatment requires an absence of discrimination on grounds of
nationality and a duty of transparencywhich enables contracting authorities to
ensure that that principle is complied with. The Court then defined the scope
of the duty of transparency in Telaustria164 and Parking Brixen.165
Accordingly, the duty of transparency is intended to preclude any risk of
favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of contracting authorities by ensuring
Makedoniko Metro and Mihaniki, cited supra note 10, para 69, where the Court held that even
if the directives on public procurement do not contain specifically applicable provisions, the
general principles of EU law govern procedures for the award of public contracts; Case
C275/98, Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S, [1999] ECR I-8291, para 30 et seq, where the Court
held that EU law principles such as the principles of transparency and the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality must embrace the remit of the public procurement
directives.
161. See Joined Cases C-117/76 & C-16/77, Ruckdeschel and Others, [1977] ECR 1753,
para 7.
162. See Joined Cases 201 & 202/85, Klensch and Others, [1986] ECR I-3477, para 9, and
Case C-442/00, Rodríguez Caballero, [2002] ECR I-11915, para 32.
163. See Commission v. Denmark , cited supra note 160, paras. 37–39, and Commission v.
Belgium, cited supra note 83, in particular paras. 51–56. See also Case C-496/99, Commission
v. CAS Succhi di Frutta, [2004] ECR I-3801, para 108.
164. Telaustria, cited supra note 10.
165. Parking Brixen, cited supra note 32.
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a sufficient degree of advertising, whichwould result in opening up themarket
to competition and by guaranteeing effective review mechanisms of the
impartiality of the procurement procedures.
The duty of transparency also implies that all the conditions and detailed
rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and
unequivocal manner in the notice or contract documents in order to enable all
reasonably informed tenderers to see their significance and to allow
unequivocally their interpretation. The duty of transparency must also enable
contracting authorities to ascertain whether the tenders submitted satisfy the
criteria applied to the relevant contract.166
5. Conclusions
The vision and aspirations of European Institutions towards a Single Market
Act167 have identified public procurement reforms as essential components of
competitiveness and growth168 and as indispensable instruments of delivering
public services.169 The Court of Justice has hinted where these reforms are
needed. The substantive public procurement rules and mainly the Public
Sector Directive suffer from legal porosity as a result of exhaustive
harmonization. Exhaustive harmonization represents a de lege lata approach
to public procurement regulation on the part of the EU legislature. This
approach has developed certain deficiencies. The effectiveness of the
procurement rules is thus compromised and the Court has applied, through a
rule of reason approach, a hybrid transplant of EU principles on the public
procurement directives in order to control their porosity. However, this
166. See Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community LawApplicable to
contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives,
O.J. 2006, C 179/02.The Commission drew up best practice in practically applying the case law
on contract awards which are not or not fully subject to the provisions of the directives but
capable of attracting considerable interest from undertakings located in different Member
States by recommending means of adequate and commonly used publication of notices in the
Member States, such as the internet, the contracting authority’s website, or specific portal
websites, national official journals and other means of publication including a voluntary
submission to the OJEU/Tenders Electronic Daily for larger value contracts.
167. See Commission Communication, Towards a Single Market Act, cited supra note 1.
168. See Commission Communication, Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, COM (2010)2020 final.
169. See Commission, Guide to the application of the European Union rules on State aid,
public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, and in
particular to social services of general interest, SEC(2010)1545 final. SeeCommission, Buying
Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement,
SEC(2010)1258, final.
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treatment is temporary and not conducive to legal certainty and legitimate
expectation.
Public contracts awarded by utilities to their affiliated entities, over which
they exercise dominant influence, do not pose any significant concern andwill
remain unaffected by any reforms. The author maintains that reforms of the
public procurement regime will be limited and focus mainly on the way
service concessions and contracts awarded by a contracting authority to
another contracting authority on the basis of an exclusive right based on law,
regulation or administrative provision compatible with the Treaty are
regulated in the public procurement acquis, in the light of its interface with the
Services Directive.170 On the other hand, public-public partnerships and
in-house contractual relations between contracting authorities or undertakings
over which the former exercise control similar to that exercised over their own
departments and the controlled entities operationally dependent on them link
conceptually very well with public service contracts relating to services of
general economic interest or contracts having the character of a
revenue-producingmonopoly, and as such reflect on the positive dimension of
inherent flexibility in the public procurement directives.
Public contracts which fall below the stipulated value thresholds
(sub-dimensional contracts) represent the most difficult category for reform.
On the one hand, they encapsulate a significant amount of Member States’
public expenditure which de lege lata escapes the control of the public
procurement acquis. On the other hand, the Court is keen to subject these
contracts to some form of competition and has supplemented the public
procurement directives with EU law principles which ensure a parallel process
of procurement with dimensional public contracts. This development has
created uncertainty in themarket and resulted in a dysfunctional application of
procurement rules to those contracts. The administrative and procedural
burdens on the part of contracting authorities often exceed any potential
efficiency benefits resulting from competitively tendering sub-dimensional
contracts. In addition, adequate safeguards against intentional division of
dimensional contracts into lots in order to avoid the applicability of the public
procurement directives exist in the current acquis.
The Green Paper uses rhetoric which implies the need for simplification of
public procurement in the European Union. The author’s view is that
simplification will result from procedural efficiencies and streamlining
the application of the substantive rules. However, the challenge of the
forthcoming reforms will be to demarcate the exhaustive harmonization of
170. See Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec.
2006 on services in the internal market (O.J. 2006, L 376/36).
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the public procurement directives in the light of market access of undertakings
from third countries and sheltered markets for small and medium enterprises.
Public procurement will be an essential part of the Single Market Act and its
regulation will play a pivotal role for the Europe 2020 Growth Strategy. Its
success will be constantly evaluated byMember States and the publicmarkets.
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